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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
____________ 
No. 13-3823 
_____________ 
 
JENNIFER BENNETT, on her own behalf and as  
Parent and Natural Guardian of Minor Child A,  
a Minor and Minor Child B, a Minor, 
                                                                       Appellant. 
v. 
SUSQUEHANNA COUNTY CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVICES;  
SUSQUEHANNA COUNTY  
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No. 3-12-cv-01912) 
District Judge:  Honorable Malachy E. Mannion 
       
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on September 11, 2014 
 
 
 
Before:  RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR. and SLOVITER Circuit Judges 
 
 
 
(Opinion filed: October 22, 2014) 
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O P I N I O N* 
   
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 Plaintiff-Appellant Jennifer Bennett sued Defendants-Appellees Susquehanna 
County Children & Youth Services (“SCC&YS”) alleging nine civil rights violations 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, one violation of the Juvenile Act under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 6301, and one claim for punitive damages.  The District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania granted defendants’ motion to dismiss and denied Bennett’s motion for 
leave to file her deposition transcript.  Bennett appeals the District Court’s ruling on ten 
of her eleven counts, and we will affirm. 
I.  Background 
 
 Bennett is a mother of two minor children.  In November 2009, one of her children 
was taken to the emergency room where doctors noticed questionable bruising.  X-rays 
revealed a fracture, and the hospital contacted SCC&YS, a state agency that protects 
children from neglect and abuse.  SCC&YS placed both children under a safety plan and 
sent them to live with Allison Reaves, the children’s paternal grandmother.  Bennett 
claims that, when trying to regain custody of her children, she was intimidated by 
defendants who stated she would “never see them [her children] again.”  (App. Br. at 8).  
Bennett finally regained custody of her children on December 30, 2011.   
      
 
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not  
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Bennett filed suit in the District Court on September 25, 2012, and defendants 
filed a motion to dismiss which was, in large part, based on the statute of limitations.  
While the motion was pending, paper discovery commenced and Bennett’s deposition 
was taken.  In her deposition, Bennett alleged deception, coercion, and intimidation by 
defendants.  Subsequently, Bennett filed a motion for leave to file her deposition 
transcript.  Bennett also claimed the statute of limitations should be tolled under federal 
equitable tolling principles and/or the continuing violations doctrine, and noted that her 
deposition offered further support for these arguments.  The District Court granted 
defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice as to ten of the eleven counts, one without 
prejudice, and denied Bennett’s motion for leave to file her deposition transcript.   
 Bennett now appeals the denial of her motion to file her deposition transcript and 
the granting of defendants’ motion to dismiss, claiming the District Court wrongfully 
granted the motion to dismiss by not considering all of the evidence which should have 
been properly before it.  Our standard of review is plenary, and we view the facts in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party.
1
  Gwynn v. City of Philadelphia, 719 F.3d 
295, 297 (3d Cir. 2013).  
II. Discussion 
 
  “Under federal law, a cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins 
to run, when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which its action 
is based.”  Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009).  The limitations period for a    
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367.  We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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§ 1983 action is the limitations period for personal injury torts in the state where the 
cause of action arose.  Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007).  Pennsylvania, which 
is where Bennett’s cause of action arose, has a two-year statute of limitations.  See Kach, 
589 F.3d at 634 (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2)).    
 Bennett’s cause of action for all claims accrued at the time of the alleged unlawful 
seizure and withholding of her two minor children on November 18, 2009.
2
  Bennett did 
not file suit until September 25, 2012, well beyond the two year limit.  Therefore, 
Bennett’s claims are untimely unless the statute of limitations is tolled under federal 
equitable tolling principles, or the continuing violations doctrine applies.  However, 
neither is applicable to Bennett’s case. 
A.  Federal Equitable Tolling Principles 
 This Court has noted three circumstances in which federal equitable tolling is 
appropriate: “(1) where a defendant actively misleads a plaintiff with respect to her cause 
of action; (2) where the plaintiff has been prevented from asserting her claim as a result 
of other extraordinary circumstances; or (3) where the plaintiff asserts her claims in a 
timely manner but has done so in the wrong forum.”  Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 370 
n.9 (3d Cir. 2000). 
                                              
2
 Bennett states counts one to nine occurred “on or about November 18, 2009.”  For count 
nine, Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted and Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress, Bennett states this claim arose from the “conduct of the Defendants, either 
individually and/or jointly as described above.”  (Appendix Vol. II of App. Br. at 33a).  
Since the conduct described above commenced on November 18, 2009, so too did the 
cause of action for cruel and unusual punishment inflicted and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. 
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 The first and third circumstances are not relevant here.  Bennett does assert, 
however, that defendants prevented her from asserting her claim due to extraordinary 
circumstances, namely, duress and undue influence.  In order to determine whether this 
argument is persuasive, we must first decide which documents we may review.   
 Bennett would have us examine her deposition transcript to bolster her claims of 
inequity.  We have stated that, where a district court did not review the evidence 
presented under a summary judgment standard, an appellate court can review such 
evidence in the interest of judicial economy.  Boyle v. Governor’s Veterans Outreach & 
Assistance Ctr., 925 F.2d 71, 74-75 (3d Cir. 1991).  However, even in review of both the 
pleadings and Bennett’s deposition transcript, we find that Bennett’s allegations and 
testimony do not reveal that she was prevented from asserting her claim as a result of 
extraordinary circumstances that would warrant equitable tolling. 
 Incidents that have warranted equitable tolling under the extraordinary 
circumstances prong include egregious attorney behavior, Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 
631 (2010), preclusion of future review for death penalty cases, Merritt v. Blaine, 326 
F.3d 157, 169 (3d Cir. 2003), and, as a guardian, conspiring to deprive a mentally 
incompetent person of her constitutional and civil rights, Lake, 232 F.3d at 360.  
Bennett’s claims do not rise to this level of severity.  Bennett claimed that, when she 
resisted signing several safety plans, she was told “many, many, many times” that her 
children would be separated and placed in foster care if she did not sign the plans.  
(Appendix Vol. II of App. Br. at 72a-73a).  These statements were not accompanied by 
threats of a court hearing or a petition; rather, it was Bennett’s belief that the SCC&YS 
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caseworkers could take action themselves.  While perhaps difficult for Bennett, these 
statements do not rise to the level of severity needed to prevent her from asserting her 
claim as required for equitable tolling.   
 Bennett further argues that, if defendants’ motion to dismiss was converted to a 
motion for summary judgment through the consideration of external evidence, the court 
would have considered more evidence favorable to Bennett and thus may have produced 
a different result.  Indeed, when a motion to dismiss is converted to a motion for 
summary judgment, a court can consider evidence outside the pleadings.  Boyle, 925 F.2d 
at 74-75.  However, as is evident from the foregoing analysis of the equitable tolling 
principle, even if the District Court had reviewed the deposition transcript, the outcome 
would not have changed.   
B.  Continuing Violations Doctrine 
 Bennett also cannot benefit from the continuing violations doctrine.  The 
continuing violations doctrine is most often applied in employment discrimination cases 
and is an “equitable exception to the timely filing requirement.”  Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 
263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting West v. 
Phila. Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 754 (3d Cir. 1995)).  The focus of the continuing violations 
doctrine is on affirmative acts of the defendants that are unlawful.  Id. at 293.  Courts 
consider two factors in determining whether to apply the continuing violations doctrine: 
(1) whether the violations were related in subject matter and (2) whether the acts were 
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recurring.  Id. at 292.
3
  In considering the frequency of the acts, courts have not set a 
standard for how close the acts must occur to amount to a continuing violation.  Id. at 
295.  Previously, we have found that when incidents are alleged to have occurred 
consistently and with increased frequency over a four-year period, this has satisfied the 
second prong of the continuing violations doctrine.  West, 45 F.3d at 755-56 (associating 
consistency with plaintiff’s daily exposure to offensive material). 
 Bennett’s claims of duress are related to the same subject matter, for they all deal 
with alleged coercion and intimidation surrounding the time period in which she sought 
to regain custody of her children.  However, the alleged acts were not unlawful for, as 
stated previously, the caseworkers reiterated to Bennett that her children could be taken 
away from her and put into foster care, a factual possibility that could have occurred upon 
their finding of continued abuse.   
 Even assuming arguendo these acts were unlawful, the frequency of the 
defendants’ alleged coercion does not rise to the level required by the continuing 
violations doctrine.  Bennett stated that she was told “many, many” times that her 
children would be taken away from her but only mentions with specificity those four 
times she signed her children’s safety plans.  We must consider the affirmative acts of the 
defendant, not the perception of the plaintiff.  Only four signed safety plans,
4
 executed by 
                                              
3
 Note that previous cases, including Cowell, laid out three factors, with the third 
requiring a showing of permanency.  However, under Mandel v. M & Q Packaging 
Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 166 (3d Cir. 2013), there is no longer a permanency requirement 
under the continuing violations doctrine. 
4
 Safety plans mentioned in Bennett’s deposition include those dated November 18, 2009; 
February 19, 2010; April 30, 2010.  Bennett also states that there was a safety plan signed 
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three different individuals are mentioned in Bennett’s deposition.  Four instances within 
the context of four years does not rise to a level of recurrence anticipated by the 
continuing violations doctrine.   
  Furthermore, “[a] continuing violation is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, 
not continual ill effects from the original violation.”  Cowell, 263 F.3d at 293 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ocean Acres Ltd. v. Dare Cnty. Bd. of Health, 707 
F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1983)).  Bennett cannot point to her continued distress as 
indicative of a continued violation.  Even assuming the defendants’ alleged threats 
constituted unlawful acts, such “continuous violations” ended when the last alleged threat 
was made, a date more than two years prior to Bennett filing suit.  In regards to her claim 
of her children’s emotional distress, Bennett claims only one act, the alleged wrongful 
displacement of her children, resulted in their emotional distress. As such, the children’s 
alleged emotional suffering is merely the effect of an isolated act and cannot benefit from 
the continuing violations doctrine.   
 Finally, the continuing violations doctrine is not a substitute for a plaintiff’s 
“awareness of and duty to assert his/her rights” in a timely fashion.  Cowell at 295.  As 
such, the doctrine “does not apply when plaintiffs are aware of the injury at the time it 
occurred.” Morganroth & Morganroth v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, P.C., 331 F.3d 
                                                                                                                                                  
after April 30th, since she signed one under Kim Harshaw, her last caseworker, whereas 
the April 30th safety plan was signed by her previous caseworker, Isaac Hobb.  A Family 
Conference was dated May 28th, 2010, and for purposes of this analysis, we can assume 
this was her last interaction with a caseworker and the last possibility of a threat.  While 
calls to Kim Harshaw are documented after this date, none of the documentation indicates 
threats made to Bennett. 
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406, 417 n.6 (3d Cir. 2003).  Bennett was aware of an alleged injury
5
 at the time the first 
safety plan was executed.  Characterizing the caseworkers’ statements as “threats,” 
Bennett was distressed at this time, describing SCC&YS as putting her “through hell.”  
(Appendix Vol. II of App. Br. at 72a, 74a).  Evidence of the children’s emotional distress 
and confusion was also documented at the time they were separated from their mother.  
(See id. at 80a, 82a, where the children expressed their dislike for visiting their mother 
and expressed their worry that her boyfriend would hurt them again).  As such, Bennett 
cannot use the continuing violations doctrine to circumvent the statute of limitations 
when she was well aware of the alleged emotional distress at the time it occurred.   
III. Conclusion 
 Neither equitable tolling principles nor the continuing violations doctrine is 
applicable to Bennett’s case; thus, her suit is untimely.  We therefore will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
                                              
5
 Our analysis in this section has focused on Count IX, the IIED claim since it is the most 
ambiguous; however, for Counts I to VIII – the Procedural Due Process, Unreasonable 
Search and Seizure, Substantive Due Process, and Deprivation of Liberty claims – the 
injury was triggered by the displacement of her children, a singular, isolated event that is 
not continuous.  As such, these counts cannot qualify under the continuing violations 
doctrine. 
